Friday, November 30, 2012
Thanks to a bunch of people for letting us know.
- Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. Super. Nov. 18, 1986).
- Eggar v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 1991 WL 315487, at *4 (D. Mont. Dec. 18, 1991) (granting summary judgment under prior case management order requiring plaintiffs to produce an medical expert's affidavit “specify[ing], for each test plaintiff, the precise injuries, illnesses or conditions suffered by that plaintiff; the particular chemical or chemicals that, in the opinion of the physician, caused each injury, illness or condition; and the scientific and medical bases for the physician's opinions. It will not be sufficient for the affidavit to state a 'laundry list' of injuries and chemicals; each injury, illness or condition must be itemized and specifically linked to the chemical or chemicals believed to have caused that particular injury, condition or illness. Moreover, the statement of scientific and medical bases for the opinion shall include specific reference to the particular scientific and/or literature forming the basis for the opinion”), aff’d, 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994)
- Cottle v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367 (Cal. App. 1992) (upholding trial court order requiring plaintiffs to identify product, exposure, alleged injury and the identity of a medical expert who will support the plaintiff's personal injury claim”).
- Atwood v. Warner Electric Brake & Clutch Co, 605 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. App. 2d 1992) (upholding trial court order requiring plaintiffs to produce case-specific medical reports and submit to defense expert medical examinations before the depositions of the plaintiffs were scheduled).
- Schelske v. Creative Nail Design, Inc., 933 P.2d 799, 802-05 (Mont. Jan. 2, 1997) (affirming district court's dismissal of plaintiffs who failed to comply with trial court order requiring product identification; use and exposure; and causation linking product defect to an identifiable injury).
- Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 1998 WL 35283824, at *5-6 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 1998) (dismissing plfs who failed to comply with Lone Pine order requiring an expert report listing all injuries, illnesses or conditions suffered by the plaintiff that were caused by exposure to materials or substances from defendant's operations, specifying what substances caused each injury, identifying the particular activity that was the source of the materials or substances, describing the exposures with specific dates, times, circumstances, incidents and dosages; andstatng the scientific and medical bases for the expert's opinions), aff’d, 200 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding no abuse of discretion by trial court in entering Lone Pine orders;“the scheduling orders issued below essentially required that information which plaintiffs should have had before filing their claims pursuant to FRCP 11(b)(3)”).
- Adjemian v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 2002 WL 358829, at *1-6 (Tex. App. March 7, 2002) (affirming district court's dismissal of plaintiffs who failed to comply with trial court order requiring production of information about the specific toxic substances to which they were exposed, the particular injuries that resulted from the exposure, and the medical evidence that supported each claimant's case).
- In re Baycol Litig., November Term, 2001, No. 0001, Order (Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Co. Dec. 12, 2003) (entering Lone Pine order in Pennsylvania state court coordinated Baycol proceeding)
- In re Baycol Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1431, 2004 WL 626866, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 18, 2004) (entering initial Lone Pine order, which was later amended, for numerous purposes including to “identify . . . the claims of those plaintiffs who have and those who do not have factually and legally sufficient support for their alleged claims and injuries or damages”).
- In re 1994 Exxon Chemical Plant Fire, 2005 WL 6252312, at *1-2 (M.D. La. April 7, 2005) (entering Lone Pine order requiring plaintiffs to produce evidence linking their alleged exposures to a particular substance with an identified injury).
- In re: N.Y. Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., slip op., Master Index No. 752,000/00, Order (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Aug. 7, 2004) (entering Lone Pine order in New York state court coordinated Rezulin proceeding).
- In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1348, 2005 WL 1105067 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2005) (ordering plaintiffs to serve case-specific expert reports, failure to do so may result in sanction of dismissal with prejudice). See 441 F.Supp.2d 567, 507 (dismissing plaintiffs whose reports were inadequate)
- In re Silica Prods. Liability Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 576 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (entering Lone Pine type order requiring each plaintiff to submit specific information about his exposure to silica dust and detailed medical information concerning each alleged injury).
- In re 1994 Exxon Chemical Plant Fire, 2005 WL 6252312 (M.D. La. Apr. 7, 2005) (entering Lone Pine order, finding that if plaintiff is unable to comply “the court should be concerned with the viability of that plaintiff’s claims” and that the Lone Pine order “would reduce costs and save time.”)
- Baker v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2007 WL 315346, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2007) (dismissing plaintiffs who failed to comply with Lone Pine case management order requiring them to produce "an affidavit from a qualified expert or experts setting forth for each Plaintiff the specific illness allegedly sustained, the date the illness was diagnosed, the name and address of the medical provider who made the diagnosis, the toxic chemical which allegedly caused the illness, the alleged manner of exposure, and the date, duration, and dose of the exposure").
- Burns v. Universal Crop Protection Alliance, 2007 WL 2811533, at *2-3 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 25, 2007) (entering Lone Pine order in products liability action brought by 82 cotton farmers against five herbicide manufacturers, finding “a preliminary showing on causation is necessary for efficient case management”).
- In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 557 F. Supp. 2d 741, 743-44 (E.D. La. 2008) (denying plaintiffs’ motion to stay Lone Pine order finding “it is not too much to ask a Plaintiff to provide some kind of evidence to support their claim that Vioxx caused them personal injury . . . Surely if Plaintiffs' counsel believe that such claims have merit, they must have some basis for that belief; after all this time it is reasonable to require Plaintiffs to come forward and show the basis for their beliefs and show some kind of basic evidence of specific causation.”); dismissal of plaintiffs for failure to comply with Lone Pine order affirmed by 388 Fed.Appx. 391, 2010 WL 2802352 (5th Cir. Jul. 16, 2010).
- In re Bextra and Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices and Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1699, slip op., (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2008) (Lone Pine order containing step-by-step enforcement enforcement procedures leading to dismissal for failure to comply).
- Abbatiello v. Monsanto Co., 569 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (in toxic tort action involving multiple parties, court denied plaintiffs’ request to stay previously entered Lone Pine order finding reason for “requiring early individual causation expert evidence, is to protect defendants and the Court from the burdens associated with potentially non-meritorious mass tort claims”).
- Arias v. Dyncorp, 2008 WL 9887418, slip op. (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2008) (entering Lone Pine order in toxic tort case involving herbicide exposure, requiring detailed exposure information, including map with location of each exposure event and submission of medical records as prerequisite to discovery). Dismissal of noncompliant plaintiffs affirmed, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 2219109, at *3 (D.C. Cir. May 30, 2014).
- Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 2008 WL 4697013, at *1 (D.N.M. Oct. 23, 2008) (dismissing plaintiffs for noncompliance with Lone Pine order requiring “expert affidavits which make a prima facie showing of harmful exposure and specific causation for each injury the particular Plaintiff claims was caused by the Defendants' alleged contamination”), aff’d on other grounds, 619 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2010) (Lone Pine noncompliance dismissals not appealed).
- McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 384 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (entering Lone Pine order requiring plaintiffs to serve case-specific expert reports on exposure, injury and causation, but due to the early stage of the litigation “failure to address the causation issue will not be grounds for immediate dismissal” but may warrant awarding defense costs and fees if summary judgment later granted on that basis).
- In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), MDL No. 875, Admin. Order #12, slip op., at sec. 5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2009) (current version of Asbestos MDL Lone Pine order, requires disclosure of expert reports supporting causation for both malignant and non-malignant cases, “objective and subjective” data on which reports are based must be "identified and descriptively set out within the report or opinion"). Dismissals based on AO #12 affirmed, see below).
- In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1871, 2010 WL 4720335 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 15, 2010) (entering Lone Pine order court noted it was concerned by unsupported Plaintiff Fact Sheets and the need to “objectively identify which of the many thousand plaintiffs have injuries which can credibly be attributed to Avandia usage.” Further, the order “merely requires information which plaintiffs and their counsel should have possessed before filing their claims: proof of Avanida usage, proof of injury, information about the nature of the injury, and the relation in time of the injury to the Avandia usage.”).
- Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Trust, 633 F.3d 828, 833-34 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2011) (upholding entry of Lone Pine order "requir[ing] written statements setting forth “all facts” supporting non-resident and post–1988 resident plaintiffs' claimed exposure, together with a written statement from an expert describing the condition for which recovery was sought, identifying the chemical to which the plaintiff was exposed, explaining the route of exposure, opining on causation, and setting forth the scientific and medical basis upon which the opinion was basedas to exposure and causation," and affirming dismissal of plaintiffs whose proffered expert report failed to satisfy Daubert).
- Pinares v. United Technologies Corp., 2011 WL 240512, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2011) (entering Lone Pine order requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a prima facie case that their property has been contaminated by the defendants’ conduct).
- Baker v. Anschutz Exploration Corp., No. 11-Civ.-6119-CJS, slip op. (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012) (entering Lone Pine order requiring plaintiffs to produce expert reports quantifying property contamination and alleged contaminants). Order deemed complied with at Baker v. Anschutz Exploration Corp., 2013 WL 3282880, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013).
- In re Fosamax Products Liability Litigation, 2012 WL 5877418 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2012) (entering Lone Pine order for particular alleged injuries to “target potentially spurious claims without imposing undue obligations upon other plaintiffs.”).
- Asarco LLC v. NL Industries, Inc., 2013 WL 943614, at *3 (E.D. Mo. March 11, 2013) (court entered Lone Pine order requiring plaintiffs to “establish (a) the identity of each hazardous substance from each Defendant's activities that resulted in exposure and which [plaintiff] claims has caused environmental injury, (b) whether any and each of these substances can cause the type(s) of environmental injuries [plaintiff] claims occurred and for which it seeks contribution (general causation), (c) the dose or other quantitative measurement of the concentration, timing, and duration of exposure, (d) the precise location of each exposure, (e) an identification, by way of reference to scientifically based studies, of the specific environmental harms that have allegedly occurred, (f) quantification of contamination to property attributable to each Defendant's operations, and (g) a conclusion that such harm was in fact caused by exposure from each separate Defendant's operations”).
- In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 718 F.3d 236, 244-45 (3d Cir. May 31, 2013) (Lone Pine order (AO 12 affirmed. MDL court properly required all asbestos plaintiffs to “submit to the court a copy of the medical diagnosing report or opinion upon which the plaintiff now relies,” and “requir[e] a complete exposure history.” Noncompliant plaintiffs were properly dismissed).
- Abner v. Hercules, Inc., 2014 WL 5817542, at *2-6 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 10, 2014) (entering Lone Pine order requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a prima facie case that their property has been contaminated by the defendants’ conduct).
Thursday, November 29, 2012
Wednesday, November 28, 2012
Tuesday, November 27, 2012
Monday, November 26, 2012
Friday, November 23, 2012
Wednesday, November 21, 2012
Well, by way of blog reader Adam Michael at Pepper, now we can do better than that. Yesterday, the Second Circuit - in a completely different case - agreed with the prediction that Rhode Island would adopt the learned intermediary rule:
Greaves v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 11-5346, slip op. at 3 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2012) (citation and footnote omitted). Uufortunately, Greaves is not a precedential decision, but that doesn't prevent it from being another step in the right direction.
As always our intrepid contributors deserve all the credit, and any blame, although there's not likely to be any this time around.
Those words were written in 1898 by Louis Ebel after the University of Michigan’s football team defeated the heavily-favored Maroons by one point. But if you didn’t know the history of “The Victors,” you might have thought the lyrics were written by Bexis. That is because “[i]n 1995, the [Michigan] Legislature amended M.C.L. 600.2946 to provide immunity for products-liability claims against a manufacturer or seller of a drug that was approved for safety and efficacy by the FDA and labeled in compliance with FDA standards.” Attorney Gen. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 807 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 803 N.W.2d 696 (2011).
First, the Court rejected the proposition that the definition of drug is limited to the API of a product. Pursuant to M.C.L. § 600.2945(d), if a product is considered a drug under federal law, it thereby falls within Michigan’s absolute defense. The FDCA, in turn, defines “drug” as: